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1.1 Study field 
Euroscepticism in the context of the Western Balkan (WB) candidate countries is an 
understudied subject. The majority of studies existing on the subject of Euroscepticism and 
European integration in the WB have been using a qualitative approach, with the majority of 
studies being one or two country-case studies (Stojić, 2006, 2017; Krastev, 2011; Konitzer, 
2011; Subotic, 2011; Antonić, 2012; Hirkic, 2019), with Belloni, (2016) and Belloni & 
Brunazzo (2017) being exceptions were the entire WB was focused upon, or one country case 
studies using a quantitative framework (Damjanovksi & Kirchner, 2019). This research 
primarily indicates that identity, cultural-based, political party-based factors and the eurozone 
crisis contribute to Euroscepticism in the WB countries.  
 
 
Damjanovski et al. (2020) stand out as the only example of quantitative research on 
Euroscepticism in the WB from a micro-level aspect, focusing on socio-demographic and 
attitudinal factors. Damjanovksi et al. (2020) employ a theoretical framework using three 
factors; (1) Utilitarian, (2) Political and (3) Identity/cultural-based to identify the strongest 
predicting factors to an increase of Euroscepticism within an individual being caused by 
socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. The results of Damjanovksi et al.'s (2020) paper 
showed that all three factors affected Euroscepticism in the WB countries, although 
cultural/identity-based factors seem to be particularly prominent. However, one study using a 
similar framework like this is not enough to fully comprehend the socio-demographic and 
attitudinal factors that lead to Euroscepticism in the WB, as it omits many important 
utilitarian, political and identity-based factors to Euroscepticism shown to be significant in 
other research on Euroscepticism for member-states, the at the time eastern European 
candidate states or theories not tested quantitatively yet. 
 
 
This thesis will use data from 2019. Due to survey-data limitations, this thesis will only focus 
on the four official WB candidate countries: Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and North 
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Macedonia. Neither Kosovo nor Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are candidate countries yet 
(European Commission, 2020a).  
 
This thesis's results indicate that sociotropic utilitarian factors are stronger than egocentric 
ones in predicting Euroscepticism, that increased internal political inefficacy felt within its 
country increases an individuals' levels of Euroscepticism, and that identity-based factors are 
the strongest micro-level predictors for Euroscepticism. Left/right-political leaning had 




This study aims to add new dimensions to the limited research on the socio-economic and 
attitudinal factors that lead to Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries on a micro-level 
basis. This thesis aims to encompass both egocentric and sociotropic utilitarian micro-level 
factors to Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries. Sociotropic utilitarian factors as a 
cause of Euroscepticism have previously not been researched in the context of all 4 WB 
candidate countries (as far as the author of this thesis is aware). Egocentric utilitarian factors 
will be measured through an individual’s perceived social class, whilst sociotropic utilitarian 
factors to Euroscepticism will be measured through an individual’s opinion on its country's 
current economic situation. Previous research on economic voting has indicated that 
individuals more often vote with their country’s economy in mind rather than their own 
(Kinder & Kiewet 1981; Anderson, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). This in relations 
to how economically dependent the WB candidate countries are on the EU could indicate that 
socoitropic utilitarian factors are stronger predictors for Euroscepticism than the previously 
researched egocentric ones. This paper aims to research the political factors how an 
individual’s perceived levels of internal political efficacy within its own country 
(or inefficacy) and left/right political position affects its levels of Euroscepticism. Lastly, in 
connection to identity-based factors, this paper aims answer how an individual’s perceived 
national and supranational (in this case, European) identity affects Euroscepticism, and to 
what degree exclusive and multiple identities affects it.   
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1.3 The lengthy accession process of the Western Balkan candidate countries 
 
The accession process for the WB countries to become members of the European Union 
started back in 1999, with the Stability and Association Process (SAP). The EU-Western 
Balkan summit in Thessaloniki in 2003 fully confirmed that the SAP-countries (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) 
were potential candidates to join the EU. One of the seven SAP-countries has successfully 
become a member of the EU since then, that being Croatia back in July of 2013. Many of the 
issues required to be solved for further accession for the WB countries that existed back in 
2003 at the Thessaloniki summit are still on the agenda yet today (European Commission, 
2020b). Böhmelt & Freyburg (2018) forecasts that only one of the WB countries will be 
compliant with the EU accession rules by the 2025 target that the European Commission has 
set for the candidate states, that being North Macedonia by 2023. Serbia looks likely to pass 
the threshold by as late as 2035 and Albania does not look likely to pass it until the 2050s 
(Montenegro was not researched). To better understand the micro-level effects to 
Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries could help us address the resistance to the 
accession process on an individual-level basis in a more effective way than previously. This 
could, in turn, help speed up the currently slow-moving accession process.  
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2. Theory and previous research 
 
2.1 Previous literatures answers to Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries 
and its research gaps 
 
The research field existing on Euroscepticism in the WB countries has given different 
answers to the phenomenon. Stojić (2006), when researching Euroscepticism in Serbia and 
Croatia, indicated that Euroscepticism was connected to the war crime trials which came as a 
result of the war-torn 1990s and the EU's role in them, with many Serbians and Croatians 
viewing the trials in a negative fashion at the time, although this was more an issue for 
Croatians. Stojić (2006) continues to add that the main advocates for Euroscepticism in Serbia 
were the populist, nationalistic and far-right parties alongside the far-right social groups of 
society. Stojić (2017) adds that a political parties' peripheral or core-position is not a primary 
reason behind and increase or decrease in Eurosceptic tendencies in the case of Serbia and 
Croatia, but Euroscepticism seems to be rooted in far-right nationalism and the opposition of 
the EU's "liberal agenda". At an individual-level, nationalism, a fear of losing national 
sovereignty, cultural heritage and a dismissal of the EU's core values are shown to be the most 
commonly occurring explanations for Euroscepticism in the WB countries in the qualitative 
research papers (Konitzer, 2011; Subotic, 2011; Antonić, 2012; Belloni, 2016; Hirkic, 2019). 
 
Stojić (2006), Subotic (2011) and Antonić (2012) indicate in their research that social class 
could play a role in predicting Euroscepticism, with the higher-class urbanites and political 
elites being perceived as the biggest winners in the case of EU-membership. Krastev (2011), 
Belloni (2016) and Belloni & Brunazzo (2017) additionally point out the Eurozone crisis and 
its effects on the WB region as a focal point behind Euroscepticism amongst the candidate 
countries, with Belloni & Brunazzo (2017) additionally claiming that the Eurozone crisis 
(alongside Brexit) further decreased the accession speed which created a sort of "EU fatigue" 




The strongest predictors for Euroscepticism at micro-level in the WB countries, according to 
Damjanovski et al. (2020) are shown to be religious affiliation, traditionalistic views, 
acceptance of authoritarianism and trust in state institutions. The identity-based factors were 
shown to be the strongest, with Muslims strongly indicated to be the least Eurosceptic whilst 
having traditionalistic views was indicated as the strongest predictor for an increase of 
Euroscepticism. Those who were accepting of authoritarianism were indicated to be more 
Eurosceptic than those who were not. In regard to political factors, so were those who trusted 
in state institutions indicated to be less Eurosceptic than those who did not. The egocentric 
utilitarian factors tested by Damjanovski et (2020) proved to be insignificant. Damjanovksi & 
Kirchner (2019) longitudinal survey-data research on opinions on EU-membership and the 
accession process in North Macedonia indicated that identity-based factors were the dominant 
predictors for an increase of Euroscepticism (with the country-specific issue of the name-
change dispute playing a significant role, alongside the fear of losing national identity) with 
rationalistic utilitarian factors (expectations of improvements to the standard of living and 
added security and stability with EU-membership) being the strongest indicator for increased 
EU-support.  
 
The strongest predictor of Euroscepticism in the WB countries, as indicated by previous 
research, appear to be identity-based ones. Utilitarian and political factors have been indicated 
to being significant, but to a lesser degree. There are however several research gaps yet 
remaining to fill when it comes to the studies of Euroscepticism in the WB candidate 
countries. Previous quantitative research in the field has only focused on egocentric utilitarian 
factors which have shown to have limited effects on Euroscepticism, ignoring sociotropic 
ones. I theorize that sociotropic utilitarian factors will be significant in relations to an 
individual's levels of Euroscepticism. Damjanovksi & Kirchner (2019) researched rationalistic 
utilitarian factors, but only in the context of North Macedonia, meaning that the results cannot 
be generalized for all 4 WB candidate countries, along with rationalistic and sociotropic 
utilitarian factors being distinguishable from each other, with many rationalistic factors being 
egocentric. Egocentric utilitarian factors will be tested in this thesis as well, as previous 
research indicates that they could be significant. I theorize that the degree of internal political 
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efficacy (or inefficacy) an individual experience within its country will be a significant factor 
in measuring its levels of Euroscepticism. I alongside that test the theory that the furthest 
right-wing individuals are in fact the most Eurosceptic in the WB-candidate countries, which 
little research using quantitative models has been performed in the context of the WB 
candidate countries to prove. Lastly, I test the assumptions that those who identify with both 
Europe and their country are less Eurosceptic than both those who only identify with Europe 
or only with their country and that those who only identify with their country are significantly 
more Eurosceptic than those who identify with both Europe and country or only Europe. This 
assumption has not previously been fully tested in the context of using a sample consisting of 
individuals from all four official WB EU-candidate countries. 
 
2.2 Utilitarian factors  
 
One of the main issues concerning the EU and the WB citizens is the distance they feel to 
Brussels. Brussels seems too far away and technocratic to solve the pressing economic and 
social issues within (Belloni, 2016). Having a European identity and striving for EU-
membership is mostly related to society's political elites and wealthier individuals. Previous 
research indicates that individuals of a higher socioeconomic class more often view 
themselves as "European" and can thus more likely be considered to be less Eurosceptic than 
those of a lower social class. These are individuals with their own business, individuals who 
frequently can afford the luxury of travelling around Europe for tourism, to study abroad and 
are in more frequent contact with people of other nationalities (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; 
Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). The regular working-class man/woman living in the WB 
countries has other issues at hand than the middle to upper-class urbanities, issues that 
Brussels bureaucrats cannot or will not help with (Stojić, 2006; Subotic, 2011; Antonić, 
2012). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
H1= Individuals of a lower social class will tend to be more Eurosceptic than those of a 
higher social class.  
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Sociotropic utilitarian explanations to Euroscepticism in the WB countries have previously 
mostly been omitted, primarily due to lack of available data, a commonly occurring issue in 
research on Euroscepticism in the WB countries (Damjanovski et al., 2020). Previous 
research on economic voting has shown that socio-tropic factors are stronger than egocentric 
ones in many cases. Individuals have been shown to vote with their countries’ wallet in mind, 
rather than their own (Kinder & Kiewet 1981; Anderson, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2007). Thus, it could be logical to assume that the average citizen prioritizes factors regarding 
its nations’ economic situation as a whole, rather than its own personal economic situation 
when it comes to political matters. Christin (2005) writes that there was a strong correlation 
between an individuals’ evaluation of the national governance and the economic situation and 
the desired speed for accession for the at the time eastern European candidate countries. It 
indicated that the worse an individual in a candidate country perceived its national governance 
and economy, the quicker they wanted the accession process to be. Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) 
means that the explanation to this is that the worse a country is perceived to perform 
politically and economically by its citizens, the lower the cost to transfer authority to the EU 
from the candidate country will be, given that they have less to lose than if their own 
government and economy was perceived to perform well without the help of EU-membership. 
Thus, the following hypothesis can be formed:  
H2a: The worse an individual view the national economic situation to be, the less Eurosceptic 
that individual will tend to be. 
However, given the indirect negative effects the eurozone crisis had on the WB countries and 
their strong dependence on the EU for economic support and trade, a case can be made for the 
opposite of H2a to be true. Between 2007-2015, 72,5% of the total Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) inflows and 72,8% of the total trade flows into the WB countries came from or were 
transferred to the EU (European Commission, 2018). The eurozone crisis significantly 
reduced the FDI inflow into the WB countries, most notably between 2009-2012. This in turn 
led to both increased political and economic unrest and instability, and an increasing “crisis of 
confidence”, where important investors grew even further sceptical about investing long-term 
in the regions’ economies, with unemployment levels reaching levels of around 30% in the 
worst hit EU-candidate country of the 4, North Macedonia (Zanelli, 2014). Some citizens of 
the WB countries directly blamed the EU for this, with EU-flags on occasions being burned 
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during protests against the national governments (Krastev, 2011; Zaneli; 2014; Belloni, 2016). 
EU-membership is seemingly not an as attractive perspective these days as it was back in 
2003 when talks first began, with the Eurozone crisis somewhat diminishing the Greek-
success story of a relatively backwards and underdeveloped country prospering with the help 
of EU-membership, which the WB countries candidates were aiming to emulate (Belloni & 
Brunazzo, 2017).  
 
It is clear that the WB candidate countries' economic prosperity is heavily tied to the 
prosperity of the EU. If a citizen is unhappy with the economic situation in its country, it 
might view the EU as being directly to blame for it, thus being more sceptic towards 
European integration and against EU-membership. Hooghe & Marks (2004) indicate in their 
research that the more confident an individual feel about its countries’ economy, the more 
likely it is that they will be positive to further European integration, further strengthening the 
idea that an individual with a negative opinion of its nations economic situation will tend to 
be more Eurosceptic. With this in mind, the following hypothesis can be formed:  
  
H2b: The worse an individual view the national economic situation to be, the more 
Eurosceptic that individual will tend to be.  
 
2.3 Political factors 
 
Previous attitudinal political factors on a micro-level that research has on Euroscepticism in 
the WB have been related to the degree of trust in the state institutions. This is the case with 
Damjanovski et al. (2020), where the results showed that people with less trust in state 
institutions are more Eurosceptic. Other research papers on political factors, not necessarily 
directly connected to Euroscepticism per se, are on rampant corruption that still hinders 
further accession for the WB countries and the EU's inability to reduce it successfully with, 
such as with Kurtuglo Eskisar & Komsuoglu (2015).  
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Previous research on political-party level Euroscepticism Stojić (2017) asked if a political 
parties' governmental/opposition and core/peripheral position affect its approach to European 
integration. The results in that paper showed that opposition parties would occasionally 
criticise governmental parties for not being "pro-European" enough, instead of encouraging 
further Euroscepticism. A parties' peripheral position is not the primary driver for 
Euroscepticism either. Peripheral Euroscepticism is stated to be identity-driven and rooted in 
nationalism and opposition to the EU's perceived liberal democracy, rather than a deliberate 
strategic decision to be "anti-European", which in turn can strengthen the claim that 
identity/culturally based factors are important drivers of Euroscepticism in the WB countries. 
Previous to that, Stojić (2006) reached a similar conclusion about party-based Euroscepticism 
in the WB, concluding that the Eurosceptic parties often do not have any "genuine" opinions 
on the European Union itself, the levels of Euroscepticism a Eurosceptic party portrays is 
often mirrored in the state of the accession progression within the country and the country's 
predicted positioning within the EU.  
 
The two political factors that focus will be put on in this paper are those of political efficacy 
(or its opposite, inefficacy) and an individual's own perceived left/right political leaning. 
 
Political efficacy can be categorised into "external" and "internal" efficacy. "Internal" efficacy 
can be defined as an individual's own perceived ability to affect the political outcome and its 
understanding of the political system, whilst "external" efficacy how responsive the 
government is to act on its citizens' wishes (Madsen, 1987; Kim, 2004; Mierina, 2014). Both 
external and internal political inefficacy have in previous research been correlated with 
political cynicism. However, due to limited data availability, internal efficacy will be the 
primary focus of this thesis. Political inefficacy has been connected to the desire for structural 
and institutional reform alongside lower trust in the current incumbents (Miller, 1974; Brehm 
& Rahn, 1997). Alongside this, higher levels of political inefficacy in an individual have 
shown to correlate with an increase of Euroscepticism in previous research by Abts et al. 
(2009) in the case of Belgium. High efficacy has in the past been correlated with higher levels 
of trust in the incumbents in former Soviet states, or "new democracies", which is what many 
of the WB countries are today (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006). Previous research, however, 
indicates that political inefficacy is still significantly more common in post-communist states 
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than in the mature, established democracies in western Europe. In turn, this political 
inefficacy leads to distrust in the national political elites (Mierina, 2014).  
 
For these reasons, higher levels of political inefficacy can be assumed to correlate with 
distrust in the EU's political elites and be against further European integration and 
membership. The following hypothesis can thus be formulated regarding Euroscepticism in 
the WB countries:  
 
H3a= The higher the level of inefficacy an individual experience within its country, the more 
Eurosceptic that individual is expected to be.  
However, given that internal political inefficacy correlates with the desire for structural and 
institutional reform, which EU-membership would bring to the WB countries, this following 
hypothesis can be formed;  
H3b= The higher the level of inefficacy an individual experience within its country, the less 
Eurosceptic that individual is expected to be.  
The far-right, or in some cases, the far-left, being classified as the biggest Eurosceptics within 
citizens of a country, is a previously well-researched scientific area. However, scholars are 
not in complete unison regarding it, and several theories exist. Previous research indicates that 
right-wing voters tend to be more sceptic towards European integration in residual welfare 
states, fearing that further European integration will lead to further convergence towards 
creating a continental welfare state. In social democratic states, the opposite can be said, as 
the left fear that further European integration will threaten their domestic welfare regime 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Brinegar & Jolly, 2005). The far-left has historically opposed the 
EU, because of its perceived neo-liberal objectives and dismantlement and a threat to the 
welfare systems. The far-right has primarily framed the EU as a supranational threat to the 
national identity, sovereignty and national borders (Van Elsas & Van der Brug, 2015; Pirro et 
al., 2018). Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) claim that both far right and left parties’ express 
economic and territorial nationalism in a similar fashion, and that high levels of nationalism 
are often connected to higher levels of Euroscepticism. However, the paper concluded that 
far-right parties, unlike far-left ones, express nationalism through the ethnic and cultural 
factors of a nation. This coincides with the historically and currently more Eurosceptic parties 
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of the WB, which often focus heavily on cultural and ethnic identity factors, often expressing 
what could be considered a far-right ideology. The far-left Eurosceptic parties in the WB have 
been largely irrelevant, compared to these far-right nationalistic ones (Stojić, 2006;2017). 
This leads us to believe that individuals with Eurosceptic tendencies in the WB are 
significantly more likely to identify as far right-wing politically than left-wing. Thus, the 
following hypothesis can be formed:  
H4= The more right-wing an individual identifies itself to be, the more Eurosceptic that 
individual will be.  
 
2.4 Identity based factors 
 
In the research by Damjanovski et al. (2020), the results showed that more traditional oriented 
and authoritarian oriented individuals tend to be more Eurosceptic, whilst Muslims tend to be 
less Eurosceptic than non-Muslims in the WB. The hypothesis in Damjanovski et al. (2020) 
stating that Muslims are expected to be less Eurosceptic than individuals with other believes 
in the WB is, however, a rather shallow hypothesis to make in the first place. A country like 
Albania in the WB has a population of almost exclusively Muslims, whilst Serbia has one of 
almost exclusively Orthodox Christians, showing rather skewed results in testing the 
hypothesis in question. A more interesting approach to religion and Euroscepticism in this 
context would be to assess how the degree of religiosity an individual possesses correlates 
with Euroscepticism. Is a devote Orthodox Christian more or less Eurosceptic than a devote 
Muslim? Is a more “casual” Muslim actually more Eurosceptic than a “casual” Orthodox 
Christian? Unfortunately, due to the lack of variables measuring this in the existing survey-
data bases, hypotheses like these cannot currently be tested in this thesis. Hirkic (2019) adds 
that Muslim countries might have a harder time becoming EU-member states, even though 
they can perhaps be shown less Eurosceptic than the orthodox Christian states, due to the 
“Christian revival” happening in the EU and the anti-Muslim sentiment created by mostly the 
far-right parties of the EU-countries.  
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Subotic (2011) argues that a European identity, or a willingness to converge to the European 
identity ideals is crucial for a country wishing to progress in their accession process. This, for 
example, largely explains why two historically similar countries like Serbia and Croatia have 
progressed at such different rates in their accession process. Serbia has experienced a process 
of identity divergence, being hesitant to or refusing to accept “European ideals”, sticking to 
the purely nationalistic Serbian identity, whilst Croatia experienced identity convergence, 
accepting European ideals and values to a greater extent, significantly speeding up the 
accession process with it (Subotic, 2011). The traditionally Eurosceptic parties in the WB 
countries take an extremely nationalistic and identity-based approach, as previously stated, 
focusing on national identity and the threat that further European integration brings to it 
(Stojić, 2017; Konitzer, 2011). McLaren (2002) shows that Euroscepticism is often connected 
to the perceived threat to national and cultural identity that the EU brings with it. The threat of 
cultures that are not your own. The EU, is thus, perceived as a threat to the national identity. 
Damjanovski & Kirchner (2019), using longitudinal data, which rarely is available in the 
context of the WB candidate countries, found that identity-based factors in North Macedonia 
were perhaps the largest factor to increased Euroscepticism amongst individuals. This was 




This “threat to national culture and identity” can, in turn be theoretically related to derivations 
of what is known as “social identity theory” (Tajfel, 1982). Lubbers & Scheepers (2007) 
writes that this type of derivation of social identity theory connected to that of cultural and 
national identity can be formulated as follows and that: “individuals have the fundamental 
need to perceive their in-group as superior to many out-groups (i.e., in-group bias). 
Subsequently, they apply favourable characteristics to themselves they perceive among 
members of the in-group via a mental process labeled ‘social identification’, and they value 
out-groups negatively via mechanisms of ‘social contra-identification’”. This derivation of 
social identity theory coincides well with previous research on identity-based Euroscepticism 
in the context of EU-member states. Individuals harbouring only one exclusive identity that 
they perceive themselves as, in this case, that of a national identity, will in term be more 
Eurosceptical and hesitant to further European integration than those with several identities, 
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viewing their nationality and cultural heritage as being superior to any other and in turn 
feeling threatened by the idea of an “European” identity and culture undermining their own 
(Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). Hirkic (2019) adds that 
further European integration EU-membership represents “nothing less than a wholesale 
handover of national sovereignty to an overbearing EU bureaucracy that regulates every 
aspect of life”, from the perspective of hard Eurosceptics in the context of the WB countries, 
and EU-member states. Damjanovksi & Kirchner (2019) adds that exclusive national identity 
in the case of North Macedonia was not shown to be a clear generator of Eurosceptic attitudes 
within an individual, but it was indicated that those who identified with both Europe and 




Hooghe & Marks (2004) adds that individuals with a strong national identity have shown to 
be more likely to identify as “European”, thus most likely be more positively opinionated on 
further European integration. Abts (2009) found that individuals who only identify as 
European in Belgium were more Eurosceptic, not less, than those who identified as both 
Belgian and European. Most people harbour multiple types of “identities”, and not an 
exclusively national identity, which can have different effects on their perceived 
“Euroscepticism” (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Klandermans et al, 2004). Carey (2002) for 
example found that those in the United Kingdom who identify themselves as “English” are 
more Eurosceptic than those who would identify themselves as “Scottish”, “Welsh”, 
“Northern Irish”, “Irish”, “British” or a mixture of them. Due to difficulties in assessing 
different types of sub-national identities in the WB countries because of lack of available 




The previous research on national identity in connection to Euroscepticism presented means 
that only looking at degree of national identity an individual feels as a factor to 
Euroscepticism is not enough, as more nationalistic people have in many cases been shown to 
identify as more European than those who do not identify with their country. Individuals in 
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the WB candidate countries with exclusively national or European identity should then 
instead theoretically be more Eurosceptic than individuals with multiple identities, with those 
who only identify with their country being more Eurosceptic than both the other mentioned 
alternatives. Given this, the following two hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
H5a= An individual with exclusive attachment to its country, will in turn be expected to be 
more Eurosceptic than those with exclusive attachment to Europe or attachment to both its 
country and Europe.  
H5b= Individuals who possess multiple identities and feel an attachment to both Europe and 
its country are expected to be the least Eurosceptic.  
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3. Material and variables  
 
3.1 Material source, limitations and composition  
 
The material used to test this thesis's hypotheses is cross-sectional data from the standard 
Eurobarometer 92.3 survey, which was undertaken between November-December 2019. 
Internationally recognized survey research institutes run the standard Eurobarometer surveys 
on behalf of the European Commission. The Eurobarometer surveys are all set up to be 
statistically fully representative of the countries’ socio-demographic set-ups, but due to this 
thesis omitting cases in which respondents replied “do not know” or refused to answer the 
items used in either the index, as control variables or hypotheses-testing variables, the sample 
composition of the cases used in this study will be less representative of the socio-
demographic realities of the countries compared to that of the available cases in the dataset. 
This is most notably the case with the Serbian cases, for which the original valid case count 
was 1017, but only 564 of them is used in this study.  
 
 
Panel analysis (known as longitudinal analysis) is not possible in the case of assessing the 
micro-level attitudinal and socio-demographic factors to Euroscepticism in the WB, due to the 
data necessary to perform does not exist readily available, meaning that a cross-sectional 
analysis is the only realistic option. Considering the severe lack of available survey data 
covering all of the six WB countries, whilst offering an adequate availability of variables 
needed to answer my hypotheses, only the four main WB candidate countries will be covered 
in this paper. These are Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Kosovo and BiH 
are, therefore, regrettably, omitted from research in this paper.  
 
 
This survey data set was chosen due to it being the most recent dataset available that covers 
the largest amounts of variables needed to answer the hypotheses of this thesis, whilst not 
excluding too many of the WB countries. The entire case count for the sample size used is 
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26611. Due to BiH and Kosovo not being included in the dataset used, a complete picture of 
Euroscepticism in the WB region and its micro-level socio-demographic and attitudinal 
effects will not be presented in this paper. However, the results will be encompassing the 4 
official WB EU-candidate countries, due to neither BiH nor Kosovo officially being 




3.2.1 Dependent variable: Index measuring “Euroscepticism”  
 
The dependent variable is a measurement of the term “Euroscepticism”. Euroscepticism can 
be defined as scepticism (soft Euroscepticism) or outright rejection (hard Euroscepticism) to 
the furtherment of European integration and EU-membership (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004; 
Abts et al., 2009). A “soft” Eurosceptic individual in the WB candidate countries does not 
necessarily completely reject potential EU-membership and further European integration, but 
is more likely critical of the accession process, against certain EU-policies or want to stand up 
for national interests that potential EU-membership can be thought to harm. “Hard” 
Euroscepticism is meanwhile considered a complete rejection of potential EU-membership 
(Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004; Belloni, 2016). Belloni (2016) insinuates that the former of the 
two, that of “soft” Euroscepticism, is significantly more common than that of “hard” 
Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries.  
 
To measure the concept of “Euroscepticism” an index containing 5 ordinal items will be 
created. In this instance, some concepts, like Euroscepticism, are too multidimensional to 
measure with only one questionnaire item, hence the creation of this index in an attempt to 
better contextualize, capture and measure it (Greenstein, 2006, p. 115-126). What score an 
individual would need to get on the index to be considered to be a “soft” Eurosceptic, contra a 
 
1 For basic demographic statistics of the sample size used, please see appendix 3.  
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“hard” Eurosceptic is not entirely clear, meaning that the index is better suited to instead help 
us understand what factors (independent variables in the regression) contribute the most to an 
individual’s levels of Euroscepticism, and in what fashion they contribute. An index is a 
better option to use as compared to only using one of items as the dependant variable, as it 
safeguards against potential measurement errors that could occur if only one of the 
questionnaire items were to be used as the measurement for “Euroscepticism” (De Vaus, 
2014, p. 131, 157).  
 
The 5 questionnaire items used to conceptualize “Euroscepticism” are 1). “EU image – 
positive/negative” measured through a Likert-type scale 1=very positive, 5=very negative, 2). 
“EU membership – good/bad”, 1= a good thing, 2=a bad thing and 3=neither good nor bad. 
Values “2” and “3” are switched places for use in the index. 3). “EU membership – country 
benefit”, 1=would benefit, 2=would not benefit, 4). “EU concept: efficient” uses a 4-point 
forced Likert-type scale with 1=Describes very well and 4=Describes very badly. 5). “EU 
concept: democratic”, use the same type of scale as item #4. 
 
To make the re-scaling and index function in the easiest and clearest way possible, the range 
for the items used and then the index will be re-scaled to be from 0-100, giving all the items 
in the scale the same upper and lower limits. 0=the least Eurosceptic answer (which would 
have been =1 in the items original coding) and 100= the most Eurosceptic answer (which is 
=3, 4 or 5 in the original coding depending on the item in question). To create an index for all 
the five items measuring “Euroscepticism” that uses a scale of 0-100, they are computed 
together as follows: 
(EU image – positive/negative + EU membership – good/bad + EU membership – country 
benefit + EU concept: democratic + EU concept: efficient) / 5 
This combines all the cases responses to the items into one unison index with a max range of 
“100” and a minimum range of “0”.  
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Cronbach’s alpha for the entire index was shown to be at .856, which signalizes that the index 
has a rather high internal consistency. An alpha value of .70 is generally speaking the 
minimum benchmark for an acceptable index (Gliem & Gliem, 2003; Esaiasson et al., 2012, 
p. 388). However, Lance et al. (2006) and Connelly (2011) argues that a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of .80 should in many be considered the bare minimum one should aim for in basic 
research, which this index surpasses. Cronbach’s alpha is shown to decrease if any of the 
items are removed from the index, which indicates that it is most likely not preferable to 
remove any of them. A factor analysis was run on the items as well, in which the results 
indicated that the scale items were unidimensional2. 
 
3.2.2 Argumentation of item choices to use in index  
 
These specific items from the dataset used were chosen for the index because they were the 
most apparent items to measure the attitudes individuals feel towards the EU and their 
opinions on potential EU membership and further European integration. This can most clearly 
be seen with items 1 through 3 in the index. The “concept” items, however, items 4 and 5, can 
in the case of the WB candidate countries, given the current attitudes towards the accession 
process, the effects of the eurozone crisis and the distance the WB citizens feel to Brussels 
contribute just as much to measure the concept of “Euroscepticism”.  
 
The lengthy accession process the WB candidate countries are currently going through can be 
said to have made individuals feel increasingly more indifferent and even some cases, more 
negative to EU-membership compared to when the negotiations first began (Belloni, 2016; 
Böhmelt & Freyburg, 2018; Damjanovksi et al., 2020). This leads us to believe that 
individuals who perceive the EU as more inefficient are more Eurosceptic. In line with the 
“democratic deficit” theory that exists within the studies of the European Union, can 
individuals who perceive the EU as being fundamentally “un-democratic” and unable to 
 
2 For further data on the internal consistency of the items used in the index and the factor analysis, please see 
appendices 4 and 5. 
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respond to the citizens' needs be considered to more Eurosceptic (Abts et al., 2009). The EU’s 
democratic output, more precisely its ability to provide benefits to its citizens that the states 
no longer can deliver, has been said to be the EU’s main claim to democratic credentials 
(Scharpf, 2006; Murdoch et al., 2018). Although the WB candidate countries' citizens are not 
citizens of the EU as of yet, their countries and themselves still heavily rely on the EU for 
both economic support and further democratization (Zaneli, 2014; Kurtoglu Eskisar & 
Komsuoglu, 2015; Belloni, 2016). This all points towards that those who view the EU as 
being either un-democratic or inefficient to be classified as being a certain dimension of 
“Eurosceptic”, in the context of the WB candidates and explains the necessity to include items 
“4” and “5” in the index. 
 
3.2.3 Independent variables for utilitarian factors 
 
All the independent variables used to present the results of this paper will be dummy coded, 
and a reference category will be used. They are all either ordinal or nominal variables. The 
independent variable used to answer H1 is “Social-class – self-assessment”. It is an ordinal-
level variable with 5 categories measuring the individuals self-perceived social class, with 
1=The working class of society, whilst 5=the higher class of society.  
 
The variable used to answer H2a and H2b is “Situation: national economy” and uses a 4-point 
forced Likert-type scale with 1= “Very good” and 4= “Very bad”.   
 
3.2.4 Independent variables for political factors 
 
H3a and H3b are answered using the variable “My voice counts – In (our country). The 




H4 is answered with the help of the variable “Left-right placement”. The variable uses a scale 
of 1-10 to measure an individuals’ own perceived placement on the left/right-scale. 1= the 
furthest left possible, whilst 10= the furthest right possible. However, the variable used to test 
the hypothesis has been coded into 5 categories to determine the individuals political leaning, 
with values “1” and “2” in the original 10-point scale being coded into value “1” for the 5-
category scale used, and so forth. 
 
3.2.5 Independent variables for identity-based factors  
 
H5a and H5b is answered with the variables “Attachment to: country” and “Attachment to: 
Europe”. These are aimed to measure an individuals’ levels of perceived nationalism and 
feeling of “European-ness”. They both use forced 4-point Likert-type scales with 1= “Very 
attached” and 4= “Not at all attached”.  
 
These two variables will be combined to create variables for individuals who only identify as 
their nationality, identify with Europe, identify with both their nationality and Europe or who 
identify with neither their country nor Europe. For example, the variable for individuals who 
only identify with their country and not Europe would encompass all the cases where an 
individual answered the values “1” or “2” for the item “attachment to: country”, and answered 
value “3” or “4”, for item “attachment to: Europe”. The new variables created are thus as 
followed:  
• Individual feels attached to Europe, but not country 
• Individual feels attached to country, but not Europe 
• Individual feels attached to both country and Europe 
• Individual feels attached to neither country nor Europe 
Individuals who feel neither attached to their country nor Europe will be used as the reference 
category to be compared to the other categories in one of the models. It can be logically 
assumed that those who identify with neither Europe nor their country to be rather dismissive 
or unbothered about further European integration, meaning that focus should instead be on the 
other three categories for which the results are more uncertain.   
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3.3 Control Variables and additional variables included 
 
3.3.1 Control variables 
 
To ensure that the relationship in the results between the dependant variable and the 
independent variables used is not due to outstanding variables as best as possible, a few 
control variables will be included in the regression. This is to as best as possible mitigate the 
problem of omitted variable bias in the regression, to ensure, at least to some degree, that the 
correlations that occur between the dependant variable and the independent variables are not 
due to spurious relationships with outstanding variables. However, due to the research design 
being used in this thesis, omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out completely. Both 
demographic and sociodemographic control variables that have been connected to 
Euroscepticism in previous research will be included and used as controls in the regression 




The demographic control variables to be used are the variables for age, gender and type of 
community. The sociodemographic variables to be used as controls cover the age of when the 
individual stopped their full-time education and employment status. These both showed to 
have little to no effect in predicting how Eurosceptic an individual will tend to be in the study 
on sociodemographic and attitudinal factors to Euroscepticism in the WB by Damjanovski et 
al. (2020). However, education level has shown to be a significant factor to Euroscepticism in 
other research and is thus worth including as a control variable. Alongside education level, 
employment status has been predicted to play a factor to an individuals’ perceived levels of 
Euroscepticism, with the unemployed being seen as potential “losers” in further European 
integration in many situations (Gabel 1998; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Hakhverdian et al., 
2013; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). However, an argument could be made that the unemployed in 
the WB countries could be less Eurosceptic than those who are employed, due to the 
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improved welfare systems that EU-membership would bring with it, as opposed to the rather 
poor welfare systems currently existing within the WB candidate countries, as compared to 
those of the EU states, especially the more developed ones (Matković, 2019).  
 
 
The demographic control variables used all represent factors that have shown in previous 
research to have various degrees of effects on the perceived levels of Euroscepticism in 
individuals, depending on the study or are factors that have been included as control variables. 
Younger individuals can be expected to be less Eurosceptic than older ones due to them being 
perceived to have a more “cosmopolitan” outlook (Carey, 2002; Polyakova & Fligstein, 
2016). The individuals’ gender is a standard control variable to take into consideration in 
studies like these. Results in studies were gender was used as a control variable have shown 
mixed results, with results showing that men tend to be more Eurosceptic than women in 
some studies (Abts et al. 2009), whilst other have shown that the opposite may be true (Carey, 
2002; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Polyakova and Fligstein, 2016). Type of community the 
individual resides in is perhaps not the most obvious factor for an increase or decrease of 
Euroscepticism levels in general. However, in the case of the WB candidate countries, it is 
worth including. Individuals who tend to identify themselves as “European” and are more 
positive to further European integration and EU-membership have been thought to be mostly 
urbanites. Meaning that those who live in larger cities in the WB candidate countries can 
perhaps tend to be more positive to further European integration and could affect the 
results (Stojić, 2006; Subotic, 2011; Antonić, 2012).  
 
 
The variable for “gender” is dummy coded, as are all control variables except for one, where 
man=1 and woman=0.  The non-dummy coded control variable is “age”, which is a scale 
variable. A value of “20” would indicate that the individual is 20 years of age, for example. 
“Type of community”, “Age education” and “Employment status” uses the same values as 
described in the table for basic demographics3.  
 
3 Please see appendix 3 for basic demographics of sample used.  
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3.3.2 Country-based dummy variables  
 
To assess the results of each country (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia)  
and how they compare to each other within the sample used, these countries will be dummy 
coded (1=it being the country in question, whilst 0=it not being the country) and included in 
the regression as independent variables, with one country, Montenegro, being the reference 




4.1 Choice of method and statistical model for paper 
 
This paper's method of choice is a quantitative research method using cross-sectional 
observational data, with the data observed being from 2019. The statistical model used in the 
method is that of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression. 
 
Each item included in the index used as the dependant variable in the OLS regression, except 
for one, will be run as the dependant variable in an Ordinary Logistic Regression (OLR) 
together with all the control and hypothesis-testing variables included in the OLS regression 
used to present the results. The odd item out, which is "EU membership – country benefit", 
only has two categories, meaning that a binary logistic regression (BLR) will be used to run a 
model for that item as the dependent variable. The results for these models are presented in 
the appendix to give a greater insight to the reader how each index item correlates with the 
explanatory independent variables4.  
 
4.2 Critical assessment of method choice, statistical model and alternatives to 
method  
 
The main issues faced when using this type of research method with cross-sectional survey 
data are related to causality, or the inability to determine causal relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. We can only clearly determine that 
statistical correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable exist, not 
 
4 The results of the OLR’s and the BLR for the index items indicated at somewhat similar results to that of model 
5, but vary to some degree. Please see appendices 1 and 2 for the full results of the logistic regression models run 
for the index items. 
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causality (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 81-85). The strongest and most statistically significant 
correlations found between the independent variables and the dependent variable could point 
to a causal relationship existing. However, it by no means implies that there is causation. 
Hypotheses testing research using cross-sectional survey-data, like the research design used in 
this thesis, cannot determine causality. Far more research and in-depth knowledge about 
Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries alongside randomly assigned independent 
variables is needed to fulfil the criteria that exist to establish causal relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable measuring Euroscepticism.  (Hill, 1965; 
Warner, 2017).  
 
We alongside not being able to determine causality cannot rule out the possibility of reverse 
causality existing between the independent variables and the dependent one. The dependant 
variable (an individuals' level of Euroscepticism) could be what is actually causing changes in 
the independent variables and not the other way around, as is presumed in this thesis 
(Vancouver & Warren, 2012). Further, we cannot rule out omitted variable bias. The control 
variables included in the statistical models can somewhat help to mitigate this problem. 
However, they cannot remove the possibility of spurious relationships occurring or clearly 
establish the ability to assess the degree of omitted variable bias existing in the results 
(Warner, 2017). As we cannot control for everything, we can only presume that the control 
variables included are enough to make sure that the results for the hypotheses testing variables 
are not biased and that the micro-level utilitarian, political and identity-based factors are in 
fact what is causing an increase or decrease in an individuals' levels of Euroscepticism.  
 
A problem existing when using a quantitative research design, in this case, is that there is no 
clear way of separating "hard" from "soft" Eurosceptics in the results. If a qualitative 
interview-based method was chosen instead, it would perhaps have been possible to 
differentiate "hard" from "soft" Eurosceptics amongst the study subjects more clearly by 
asking more in-depth questions. However, using a quantitative method, in this case, can give 
us more generalizable results of what factors cause an increase or decrease to an individual's 
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levels of Euroscepticism, which the study field of Euroscepticism in the WB countries 
currently lacks.  
 
Using an OLR regression as a statistical model to present the results as opposed to an OLS 
regression was an option. However, a scale measuring the level of Euroscepticism in an 
individual that includes several items can be assumed to be better equipped to measure 
Euroscepticism's multi-dimensional concept than if only one of the index's ordinal items were 
to be used as an independent variable. The usage of an OLS regression as the statistical model 
with an index produces more concrete and presentable results to which of the independent 
variables lead to an increase or decrease in an individual's level of perceived Euroscepticism, 




5.1 How to interpret the results of the models 
 
Standardized beta coefficients (ß*) have been presented in the models to make comparability 
between models and the independent variables possible and to understand better which types 
of factors have the greatest effect on the independent variable of Euroscepticism. With the 
index used as the dependant variable using a scale of 0-100, with 0=the least Eurosceptic 
value and 100=the most, a negative ß* value for an independent variable indicates that it 
contributes negatively to an individual’s levels of Euroscepticism (i.e. they are less 
Eurosceptic), whilst a positive ß* value indicates the opposite.  
 
All the models run in the results were checked for any signs of multicollinearity. The 
categories “age education” and “employment status” suffered from significant 
multicollinearity between each other when the two items were run in a model together. To 
mitigate this, the category “16-19” from “age education” was excluded from the models, as it 
was perceived as being redundant and to reduce multicollinearity. This does not affect the 
results of this paper in any significant way, as including all the categories in the regression 
would not bring any additional information to the models. However, one should take caution 










Table 1. Results of regression (standardized regression coefficients)  
 
 Categories Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Utilitarian factors:       
Social class Working class   0,050*    0,021 
 Lower middle-class   0,027   -0,008 
 Upper middle-class  0,004   -0,001 
 The higher-class of society   0,012    0,013 
 (ref. middle-class)      
Situation: national 
economy 
Very good  -0,012   -0,019 
 Rather bad  0,112***    0,041* 
 Very bad  0,187***    0,098*** 
 (ref. rather good)      
Political factors:       
My voice counts in my 
country 
Totally agree    -0,040+  -0,019 
 Tend to disagree     0,104***   0,087*** 
 Totally disagree     0,211***   0,140*** 
 (ref. tend to agree)      
Left/right placement (1-
10 scale) 
1-2 (Left)      0,019  -0,005 
 3-4      -0,009   0,005 
 7-8       0,058**   0,041* 
 9-10 (Right)       0,038*   0,013 
 (ref. 5, 6. Centre)      
Identity-based factors:       
Individual attachment 
to Europe and country 
Attached to Europe and 
country 
   -0,483***  -0,425*** 
 Attachment to country, but 
not Europe 
   -0,098**   -0,073* 
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 Attachment to Europe, but 
not country 
   -0,195***  -0,204*** 
 (ref. attachment to neither 
Europe nor country) 
     
Control variables:       
Gender Male (ref. female) -0,016 -0,021 -0,019                -0,024 -0,026 
Type of community Rural area or village -0,056* -0,055* -0,056* -0,029 -0,031 
 Large town  0,030  0,027  0,030  0,040+  0,034+ 
 (ref. small/middle town)      
Age education Up to 15  -0,010 -0,009  0,000  0,048* -0,040* 
 20+ -0,113*** -0,105*** -0,115*** -0,060** -0,069** 
 No full-time education -0,036* -0,050* -0,026 -0,031+ -0,035* 
 (ref. still studying, 16-19 
excluded due to 
multicollinearity issues) 
     
Age exact    0,115***  0,100***  0,109***  0,124***  0,109*** 
Employment status Student  0,044  0,059+  0,061*  0,066*  0,080** 
 Unemployed  0,105**  0,108**  0,119**  0,097**  0,113** 
 Retired  0,112**  0,126***  0,131***  0,125***  0,141*** 
 Self-employed  0,106**  0,110**  0,130***  0,113**  0,132*** 
 Employed  0,148**  0,166**  0,173***  0,168***  0,190*** 
 (ref. responsible for 
ordinary shopping) 
     
Country dummy-
variables:  
      
 North Macedonia -0,028 -0,084** -0,062*  0,019 -0,030 
 Serbia  0,101***  0,064*  0,070**  0,032 -0,004 
 Albania  0,231***  0,242*** -0,251*** -0,227*** -0,247*** 
 (ref. Montenegro)      
R2 Adj:  0,114 0,144 0,167 0,263 0,301 
Significance levels: +: p<0,1, *: p<0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,00. (Dataset source: European 




5.2 Categorical assessment of results  
 
5.2.1 Presentation of model results  
 
Table 1 above demonstrates the results of the paper with 5 different models being run in an 
OLS regression tested. Model 1 tests only the control and dummy country variables, which 
will be used as a baseline in the remaining models. Model 2 tests the utilitarian factors, model 
3 tests the political factors, model 4 tests identity-based factors and model 5 tests all of the 
factors together.  
 
 
Model 1 shows the results of an OLS regression with only the control and dummy-coded 
country variables in it. This model in itself plays no real significance in rejecting or accepting 
the hypotheses of this paper. However, it serves as a baseline to the rest of the models and 
explains what degree of correlation is explained by the non-hypotheses testing independent 
variables. What then can be said about the results in model 1 is first that gender does not seem 
to affect levels of Euroscepticism. Age, type of community, age of education, employment 
status, and country are all shown to be significant to some degree. But it is important to 
interpret the results of the variable "age education" with caution, due to the category "16-19" 
being excluded due to reasons relating to multicollinearity. "20+" is shown to be significant 
with a ß*= -.113 (p<0,001). The results for "no full-time education" are shown to be 
significant (ß*= -.036, p<0,05) but can mostly be dismissed throughout the models due to the 
ß* value being as weak as it is. The variable for age shows that for every full standardisation 
of movement we see within age, the dependant variable for Euroscepticism increases by .115 
std. deviations (Age ß*= .115, p<0,001). Thus meaning, the older an individual is, the more 
Eurosceptic that individual will tend to be. Those living in rural areas can be considered to be 
slightly less Eurosceptic than those living in large or small towns, but only marginally so as 
the ß*= -.056 (p<0,05). Looking at employment status, all the categories except for "student" 
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are shown to be significant. Perhaps a bit surprisingly are the employed individuals shown to 
be the most Eurosceptic with a ß*= .148 (p<0,01), with the retired following in second place 
with a ß*=.112 (p<0,01). Both unemployed (ß*= .105 p<0,01) and self-employed (ß*= .106, 
p<0,01) are shown to be significant. Looking at the country dummy-variables (ref. 
Montenegro) so can the variable for Albania be shown to be highly significant with a ß*= -
.231 (p<0,001). Serbia is significant with a ß*= .101 (p<0,001), but the main takeaway is that 
Albanians are in this model shown to be significantly less Eurosceptic than citizens of the 
other WB candidate countries. It can be stated that 11,4% (R2 adj=.114) of the variance in the 
dependant variable for Euroscepticism is explained by the control variables and country-based 
dummy variables alone.  
 
 
Model 2 tests the utilitarian factors of social class and opinion on the current economic 
situation of an individual's country and their effects on Euroscepticism. An individual's social 
class seems to be rather insignificant in relations to measuring Euroscepticism. The category 
measuring working-class individuals is shown to be significant. However, it has a rather low 
ß* at .050 (p<0,01), indicating that the working class can perhaps be indicated to be the most 
Eurosceptic of the social classes, but only slightly so. The sociotropic factor, which is that 
measuring an individual's opinion of the current economic situation in their country is 
significantly more potent. An overwhelmingly positive opinion on its countries' current 
economic situation does not seem to affect an individual's levels of Euroscepticism. However, 
the categories for negative opinions on the countries' economy are both significant and 
somewhat strong indicators for an increase in Euroscepticism. The ß* for those who believe 
that the economic situation is rather bad is = .112 (p<0,001), whilst the predictor for those 
who believe the economy is very bad has a ß*= .187 (p<0,001), when compared to those who 
think it is rather good. This in turn predicts that the worse an individual views' the national 
economy, the more Eurosceptic that individual will tend to be. Model 2 explains 14,4% (R2 
adj= .144) of the variance in the dependent variable, meaning that the utilitarian factors do not 
explain that much more of the variance in the dependant variable of Euroscepticism than that 
of the control and country-based variables tested in model 1. The control variables remain 
rather unchanged from model 1, however now in model 2, one can see a slight shift in the 
country dummy-variables ß* values on levels of significance. The ß* value still remains high 
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and at roughly the same level for Albania, but the variable for North Macedonia is now 
significant and has a ß*= -.084 (p<0,01), whilst the variable for Serbia is less significant and 
impactful with the ß*= .064 (p<0,05).  
 
Model 3 tests the political factors of the perceived levels of internal inefficacy an individual 
experience and its left/right political leaning. Looking at the variable measuring political 
efficacy we can see that there is significant proof that those who feel like their voice does not 
count in their country are more Eurosceptic than those who do. The predictor for those who 
answered tend to disagree has a ß*= .104 (p<0,001) whilst the one for those who 
answered totally disagree has a ß*= .211 (p<0,001). The significance levels for the 
category totally agree are not high enough to draw any concrete conclusions from. However, 
it indicates that those who feel the highest amount of internal efficacy within its country are 
marginally less Eurosceptic than those who only somewhat feel internal efficacy (ß*= -.040, 
p<0,1). The results of model 3 indicate that the more internal political inefficacy an individual 
experience, the more Eurosceptic that individual will be. The left/right political leaning of an 
individual can be shown to indicate somewhat that those who lean right politically are the 
most Eurosceptic, but it is not that straight-forward. The margins between the ß* values for 
category "8-9" (ß*= .058, p<0,01) and "9-10" (ß*= .038, p<0,5) are rather minuscule, and the 
predictors are weak in themselves, meaning that they are hard to draw clear conclusions from. 
Those who identify as being the most right-wing are alongside that not indicated to be the 
most Eurosceptic. Model 3 explains 16,7% (R2 adj= .167) of the variance in the dependant 
variable, meaning that the political predictors overall are slightly stronger than the utilitarian 
ones tested in model 2. The control variables in model 3 remain rather unchanged from those 
in model 2. The country-based dummy variables change slightly from model 2 to model 3. 
The Albanian predictor remains at roughly the same strength and significant levels as 
previously. However, the predictors for North Macedonia and Serbia change slightly, North 
Macedonia becomes slightly weaker and less significant (ß*= -.062, p<0,05), whilst the 
variable for Serbia changes slightly in the opposite direction (ß*= .070, p<0,01).  
 
 
Model 4 test the identity-based factors to Euroscepticism, which in this thesis is an 
individual's attachment to Europe and its country. Looking at the results, one can clearly see 
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that an individual who feels attached to both its country and Europe are predicted to be 
significantly less Eurosceptic than individuals who are not, with a ß*= -.483 (p<0,001), even 
more so than individuals who only feel an attachment to Europe, where the ß*= -.195 
(p<0,001). There is significance for the category measuring those who only identify with their 
country (ß*= -.098, p<0,01), indicating that those who only identify with their country are 
more Eurosceptic than those who identify with only Europe or both Europe and their country, 
but slightly less Eurosceptic than those who identify with neither country nor Europe. Model 
4 predicts 26,3% (R2 adj= .263) of the variance in the dependant variable, meaning that the 
identity-based factors are by far the strongest predictors for an individual's levels of 
Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries when compared to the other factors tested. The 
control variables remain mostly unchanged in model 4 as compared to model 3. Albania's 
predictor is the only country-variable that is now significant, indicating again that Albanians 
are the least Eurosceptic.  
 
 
Model 5 includes the effect parameters of all the factors tested in the previous models. 
Comparing model 2 with model 5 shows that the predictors are less powerful in model 5. The 
class of an individual, as shown in model 5 has no significance on the level of Euroscepticism 
an individual has. When testing for how an individual's views on its countries economic 
situation affect its levels of Euroscepticism in model 5, the predictors' strengths have 
decreased. However, significance can still be found for those who believe it is very bad (ß*= 
.098, p<0,001) and rather bad (ß*= 0.41, p<0,5). This still indicates that those who view the 
national economy as being in a bad state are more Eurosceptic than those who do not. When 
comparing the results of the political factors in model 3 to those in model 5 it is still evident 
that individuals who experience internal inefficacy are more Eurosceptic than those who do 
not. The predictor for those who tend to disagree that their voice counts in their country has a 
ß*= .087 (p<0,001) and the one for those who totally disagree has a ß*= 0.140 (p<0,001). The 
result for the predictors of those who totally agree that their voice counts in their country is 
insignificant. Left/right placement is less significant in model 5 as compared to model 3, and 
"9-10" is no longer significant, and the predictor for "7-8" is now weaker, however still 
significant (ß*= .041, p<0,5). The results of model 5 further weaken the claim that those who 
identify as the furthest right-wing are the most Eurosceptic in the WB candidate countries. 
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When comparing the results of the identity-based factors in model 4 to those of model 5 no 
significant change is noticeable. The predictor for those who identify as both European and 
with their nationality remains the strongest predictor of all the independent variables with ß*= 
-.425 (p<0,001), whilst the predictor for those who identify with Europe, but not their country 
remains a significant and strong predictor with ß*= -.204 (p<0,001). The predictor for those 
who only identify with their country is weaker in model 5 but still significant (ß*= -.073, 
p<0,05). It still indicates that those who only identify with their country are more Eurosceptic 
than the other two categories in focus. Model 5 explains 30,1% (R2 adj= .301) of the variance 
in the dependant variable of Euroscepticism. This is not significantly different from the 
variance of the dependant variable that model 4 explains (R2 adj= .263 in model 4), which 
strengthens the claim that the identity-based factors are by far the most dominant predictors to 
Euroscepticism in an individual, when assessing the 3 factors analysed in this paper. The 
results for the control variables remain similar to those in model 4. Once again, it is predicted 
that Albanians are overall the least Eurosceptic people of the WB candidate countries.  
 
5.2.1 Hypotheses acceptance/rejection 
 
Starting with the utilitarian-based factors and looking at results of models 2 and 5, H1 cannot 
be accepted. Those who identify as being working class are shown to be slightly more 
Eurosceptic than the rest of the classes, but barely so, and only in model 2. It cannot with 
certainty be said that H1 is factual. Thus, it must be rejected, even with Stojić (2006), Subotic 
(2011) and Antonić (2012) suggesting that the upper class could perhaps be more inclined to 
accept further European integration in the WB candidate countries. Alongside Eichenberg & 
Dalton (1993) and Polyakova & Fligstein (2016) suggesting that the less travelled lower 
classes be more sceptic towards further European integration than the upper classes of society. 
It is clear that H2a can be rejected, whilst H2b can be accepted when looking at the results of 
models 3 and 5. This can perhaps be due to the citizens of the WB candidate countries 
blaming the EU for the eurozone crisis and the severely negative effects it proved to have on 
the region’s economy, considering how economically dependent the WB candidate countries 




Moving on to the political factors, and looking at models 3 and 5, can the conclusions be 
made that H3a can be accepted and H3b be rejected. The results here correlate with the 
conclusions reached by Abts et al. (2009) when researching Euroscepticism in Belgium. An 
individual experiencing higher levels of internal inefficacy within its own country will be 
shown to be more Eurosceptic than those who experience it less, or not at all. H4 cannot be 
accepted, as models 3 and 5 do not indicate that those who identify as being the furthest right-
wing are the most Eurosceptic. This is rather surprising, as previous research has indicated 
that the predominantly Eurosceptic parties of the WB candidate countries throughout history 
have been considered to be “far-right” (Stojić, 2006;2017).  
 
 
Lastly, looking at the identity-based factors and models 4 and 5, both H5a and H5b can be 
accepted. It was rather expected to find that those with exclusive attachment to their country 
to be more Eurosceptic than those with exclusive attachment to Europe or those with 
attachment to both Europe and country, even though Damjanovksi & Kirchner (2019) did not 
find that an exclusively national identity to be a clear-cut predictor for an increase in levels of 
Euroscepticism in the case of North Macedonia. But it was perhaps less obvious that those 
who identified with both Europe and their country to be less Eurosceptic than those who 
exclusively identified with Europe5. But this coincides with previous research on 
Euroscepticism by Carey (2002), Hooghe & Marks (2004) and Abts et al (2009) that indicates 
that multiple identities can result in lower levels of Euroscepticism, as opposed to an 
exclusively European one.  
 
5 The results of the OLR’s and the BLR run for the items used in the index somewhat contradict this claim. 
However, the results of the models presented in the main text are indicated to be more reliant than those in 
appendices 1 and 2 and uses a dependant variable that combines all of the dependent variables used in the OLR’s 
and the BLR into one measurement, meaning that accepting H5b is the logical conclusion. 
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6. Concluding remarks and discussion  
This thesis set out to further expand the research field of the micro-level socio-demographic 
and attitudinal factors to Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries. The factors 
researched were that of utilitarian, political and identity-based factors. The reason for this was 
the seemingly lacking research existing in the area and the importance to better understand the 
underlying micro-level factors to Euroscepticism in what could be the next EU-member states 
in the future to come.  
 
This paper's results indicate that all three types of factors tested have some, but varying 
degrees of effects on an individual's levels of Euroscepticism. Sociotropic utilitarian factors 
were shown to be more significant than egocentric ones, indicating that individuals may put 
its countries economic interests over their own when considering potential EU-membership. 
Regarding political factors, so were individuals perceived to experience internal inefficacy 
within its country shown to be more Eurosceptic than those who did not. The identity-based 
factors were shown to be the most significant of all the three types of factors tested, with 
individuals who identified as both European and with their country predicted to be even less 
Eurosceptic than those who only identified with Europe. Those who only identified with their 
country were shown to be more Eurosceptic than those who identified with both Europe and 
their country or only Europe. Lastly, Albanians were consistently shown to be the least 
Eurosceptic people of the WB candidate countries, with some of the models suggesting that 
Serbians might be the most Eurosceptic.  
 
Further research on Euroscepticism in the WB candidate countries is still necessary. It 
remains a rather understudied field compared to how much research exists on Euroscepticism 
in the EU-member states. Especially lacking are studies using a quantitative framework 
similar to what this study has used. Future research papers could delve deeper into 
researching how religion and degree of religiosity affects an individual's perceived levels of 
Euroscepticism. Damjanovksi et al. (2020) focused on religion as a factor to Euroscepticism 
in the context of the WB countries. However, they only found Muslims were less Eurosceptic 
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than Orthodox Christians, not how the degree of religiosity affects its levels of 
Euroscepticism. Geographical factors to Euroscepticism could also be an important factor to 
further research. How does proximity to an EU-border affect an individual's levels of 
Euroscepticism? Further research on "soft" contra "hard" Euroscepticism in the WB candidate 
countries could be shown to be important, as this study could not clearly differentiate between 
the two with the method used. Lastly, so are longitudinal micro-level studies scarce in the 
context of WB Euroscepticism research, with an exception being Damjanovski & Kirchner 
(2019) when researching factors to Euroscepticism and opinions on European integration in 
North Macedonia. Longitudinal studies could, in turn, help us further establish causality 
between Euroscepticism and its assumed underlying causes, even more so than studies using 
cross-sectional data. However, the ability to perform these types of studies depends on 
available datasets or the ability to collect new data. As of now readily available datasets 
covering the WB countries are rather limited. 
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Appendix 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression results for ordinal-scale index items as 
dependant variable 
 
Index item used as 
dependant variable: 











Threshold:       
Value 1 (Least Eurosceptic)   1,741 -0,224  0,911 -0,36  
Value 2   4,577*** 1,057  3,179* 2,694+  
Value 3   6,275***   5,204*** 4,450**  
Value 4   7,561***     
Value 5 (Most Eurosceptic)       
Location:       
Utilitarian factors:       
Social class Working class  1,082+ -1,740**  0,816 -0,693  
 Lower middle-
class 
 1,020+ -1,830**  0,776 -0,810  
 Middle class  1,041+ -1,715**  0,589 -0,886  
 Upper middle-
class 
 0,899 -1,323*  0,483 -1,219*  
 The higher-class 
of society 
 0a 0a  0a 0a  
Situation: national economy Very good -0,678*** -0,209 -0,113 -0,942***  
 Rather good -0,728*** -0,634*** -0,044 -0,438**  
 Rather bad -0,491*** -0,047 -0,235* -0,343**  
 Very bad  0a 0a  0a 0a  
Political factors:       
 
 
My voice counts in my 
country 
Totally agree -0,784*** -0,631*** -1,088*** -0,825***  
 Tend to disagree -0,737*** -0,918*** -0,262* -0,189  
 Tend to disagree -0,486*** -0,324* -0,233+ 0,022  
 Totally disagree  0a 0a  0a 0a  
Left/right placement (1-10 
scale) 
1-2 (Left) -0,312* -0,476*  0,156 0,236  
 3-4   0,044 -0,045 -0,177 0,075  
 5 (Centre)  0,056 -0,259 -0,023 0,204  
 7-8  0,276+  0,175  0,120 0,397*  
 8-9-10 (Right)  0a  0a  0a   
Identity-based factors:       
Individual attachment to 




-1,211*** -1,691*** -1,604*** -1,686***  
 Attachment to 
country, but not 
Europe 
 0,093 -0,220 -0,391** 0,416**  
 Attachment to 
Europe, but not 
country 
-2.277*** -1,518*** -2,005*** -2,850***  
 Attached to 
neither country 
nor Europe 
 0a 0a 0a 0a  
Control variables:       
Gender Male 
(female=0) 
-0,076 -0,069 -0,072 -0,125  
Type of community Rural area or 
village 
-0,351*** -0,414** -0,239** -0,076  
 Small/middle 
town 
-0,167+ -0,254* -0,166+ 0,029  
 Large town  0a  0a 0a 0a  
 
 
Age education Up to 15   3,721***  0,613 2,270+ 2,858*  
 16-19  3,910***  0,577 2,492* 2,787*  
 20+  3.584***  0,355 2,267+ 2,527+  
 Still studying*  0a  0a 0a 0a  
 No full-time 
education 
 0a  0a 0a 0a  
Age exact    0,015***  0,015** 0,012*** 0,012**  
Employment status Responsible for 
ordinary 
shopping  
-0,447* -0,596* -0,910*** -0,834***  
 Student  3,814***  0,528 2,466+ 2,636*  
 Unemployed -0,299** -0,192 -0,023 -0,194  
 Retired  0,072 -0,070 -0,71 -0,062  
 Self-employed  0,095  0,259 0,106 -0,103  
 Employed  0a  0a 0a 0a  
Country dummy-
variables:  
      
 North 
Macedonia 
 0,934***  1,892*** 0,120 0,310**  
 Montenegro  0,762***  1,958*** 0,433*** 0,671***  
 Serbia  1,047***  2,127*** 0,381** 0,412***  
 Albania  0a  0a 0a 0a  
Pseudo R2:  Cox & Snell  0,237  0,252 0,182 0,190  
 Nagelkerke  0,255  0,321 0,199 0,213  
 McFadden  0,103  0,188 0,083 0,094  
Significance levels: +: p<0,1, *: p<0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001. a= parameter is redundant 
(comparison category).  
The category “Still studying” in the variable “age education” is included in the category “student” 
for the variable “employment status”, thus becoming redundant*.  
Interpret the results with caution, the assumption of proportional odds were not shown to be 
satisfied in any of the models.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Binary Logistic Regression results for binary index item as dependant 
variable  
 
Dependant variable:  EU-membership – country benefit (1= would not 
benefit, 0= would benefit) 
Utilitarian factors:   
Social class Working class -0,920 
 Lower middle-class -0,999 
 Middle class -0,910 
 Upper middle-class -0,537 





Very good -1,246** 
 Rather good -0,856*** 
 Rather bad -0,319* 
 Ref. category “Very bad”  
Political factors:   
My voice counts in 
my country 
Totally agree -0,576** 
 Tend to disagree -1,176*** 
 Tend to disagree -0,301 
 Ref. category “Totally disagree”  
Left/right placement 
(1-10 scale) 
1-2 (Left) -0,329 
 3-4  -0,309 
 5 (Centre) -0,462* 
 7-8  0,060 








Europe and country 
Attached to Europe and country -2,090*** 
 Attachment to country, but not Europe -0,406* 
 Attachment to Europe, but not country -2,290*** 
 Ref. category “Attached to neither 
country nor Europe” 
 
Control variables:   
Gender Male (female=0) -0,091 
Type of community Rural area or village -0,302+ 
 Small/middle town -0,078 
 Ref category “Large town”  
Age education Up to 15  0,466 
 16-19 0,683 
 20+ 0,116 
 Still studying 0,357 
 Ref category “No full-time education”  
Age exact   0,019** 
Employment status Responsible for ordinary shopping  -1,165** 
 Unemployed 0,016 
 Retired 0,147 
 Self-employed 0,376+ 
 Ref category “Employed”  
 (“Student omitted due to being included 





 North Macedonia 2,194*** 
 Montenegro 2,439*** 
 Serbia 2,080*** 
 Ref category “Albania”  
Pseudo R2:  Cox & Snell  0,223 
 
 
 Nagelkerke                         0,381 
Constant:   -1,334 





















Appendix 3: Demographics of sample used  
 
  MKD MNE SRB ALB Entire sample 
n   698 411 564 988 2661 
Gender Male 50.3% 54.3% 52.7% 53.5% 52.6% 
 Female 49.7% 45.7% 47.3% 46.5% 47.4% 
Age Median 50 42 44 42 44 
 Mean 49.31 41.7 44.43 42,71 44.63 
 Standard deviation 16.965 12.934 14.378 13.932 15.014 
Type of community Rural are or village 40.4% 27% 37.1% 41.2% 37.9% 
 Small/middle town 33.1% 43.3% 23% 19.8% 27.6% 
 Large town 26.5% 29.7% 39.9% 39% 34.5% 
Age education Up to 15 21.8% 4.9% 3.9% 14.8% 12.8% 
 16-19 39% 65.2% 58.3% 48.8% 50.8% 
 20+ 33% 24.1% 30.9% 29.1% 29.7% 
 Still studying 5.6% 5.8% 6.9% 7.3% 6.5% 
 No full-time 
education 
0.7% 0% 0% 0% .2% 
Employment status Responsible for 
ordinary shopping 
5.2% 9% 1.1% 4.3% 4.5% 
 Student 5.6% 5.8% 6.9% 7.3% 6.5% 
 Unemployed 20.2% 7.5% 10.3% 14.3% 13.7% 
 Retired 27.1% 6.3% 12.4% 9.5% 14.4% 
 Self-employed 9% 6.3% 9.2% 16.3% 11.3% 
 Employed 33% 65.5% 60.1% 48.4% 49.5% 
Social class (self-
perceived) 
Working class 27.8% 13.9% 28.9% 3.7% 16.9% 
 Lower middle-class 18,5% 15.6% 22.3% 27% 22% 
 Middle-class 49,3% 60.6% 44.5% 65.3% 56% 
 
 
 Upper middle-class 3,3% 9.7% 3.9% 3.8% 4.6% 
 The upper class 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0,5% 
 























Cronbach’s alpha: .856                      
Cronbach’s alpha if 
item deleted:    
                .823 .814 .815 .846 .828   
Corrected item-
total correlation:  
 .707 .718 .723 .589 .671   
Mean: 27,513 35,907 19,723 16,001 34,834 31,088   
Std. deviation: 24,268 24,585 34,788 36,675 28,204 26,243   
 
 
Appendix 5: Factor analysis on index items  
 
  Eigenvalue Total % of variance accounted for 
Component 1 3.229 64.575 
Component 2 .802 16.033 
Component 3 .399 7.984 
Component 4 .311 6.213 





Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics for hypotheses testing independent variables  
 













6. Attachment to: 
Europe 
n= 2661       
Mean: 2.50 2.72 2.40 2.82 1.59 2.44 
Median: 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
Mode: 3 (The middle 
class of society) 
3 (Rather 
bad) 
2 (Tend to 
agree) 




2 (Fairly attached) 
Modal 
percentage: 
56% 46% 41.5% 38.7% 54.7% 43.3% 
Std. Deviation: .842 .818 .887 1.183 .757 .886 
Skewness: -.495 -.201 .164 0.114 1.166 .204 
Minimum 
value: 
1 (The working 










1 (Very attached) 
Maximum 
value: 
5 (The higher 
class of society) 





4 (Not at all 
attached)  








Appendix 7: Items and categories used from ZA7601: Eurobarometer 92.3 
(November-December 2019): Standard Eurobarometer as originally coded 
 Values/categories Variable name in dataset 
Country-based variables:   
North Macedonia  0=Not mentioned (all other)  
1=Mentioned  
q1.31 
Montenegro  0=Not mentioned (all other)  
1=Mentioned 
q1.32 
Serbia 0=Not mentioned (all other)  
1=Mentioned 
q1.33 
Albania 0=Not mentioned (all other)  
1=Mentioned 
q1.34 
Variables used in dependent 
variable (index):  
  
EU image – positive/negative 1= Very positive  
2= Fairly positive  
3= Neutral  
4= Fairly negative  
5= Very negative  
d78 
EU membership – good/bad 
(candidates) 
1= A good thing 
2= A bad thing  
3= Neither good nor bad 
qa9a 
EU membership – country benefit 
(candidates) 
1= Would benefit  
2= Would not benefit  
qa10a 
EU concept: efficient  1= Describes very well 
2= Describes fairly well 
3= Describes fairly badly  
4= Describes very badly 
qa8_4 
EU concept: democratic  1= Describes very well 
2= Describes fairly well 




4= Describes very badly 
Hypotheses testing variables:   
Social class - self-assessment (5 
cat) 
1= The working class of society  
2= The lower middle class of 
society 
3= The middle class of society  
4= The upper middle class of 
society 
5= The higher class of society 
d63 
Situation: National economy  1= Very good 
2= Rather good 
3= Rather bad 
4= Very bad 
qa1a_2 
My voice counts: In (our country) 1= Totally agree 
2= Tend to agree 
3= Tend to disagree  
4= Totally disagree 
d72_2 
Left-right placement - recoded 5 
categories 
1= 1 - 2 (left) 
2= 3 - 4 
3= 5 - 6 (centre) 
4= 6 - 7 
5= 8, 9, 10 (right) 
d1r2 
Attachment to: country 1= Very attached 
2= Fairly attached  
3= Not very attached 
4= Not at all attached 
qc1a_2 
Attachment to: Europe 1= Very attached 
2= Fairly attached  
3= Not very attached 
4= Not at all attached 
qc1a_4 
Control variables:   




Age exact Exact age of respondent d11 
Type of community 1= Rural are or village  
2= Small/middle town 
3= Large town 
d25 
Age education (recoded 5 
categories) 
1= Up to 15 
2= 16-19 
3= 20+ 
4= Still studying  
5= No full-time education 
d8r2 
Occupation of respondent  
(5 through 9= self-employed and 10 
through 18 = employed in recoded 
variable used in thesis) 
1= Responsible for ordinary 
shopping, etc.  
2= Student  
3= Unemployed, temporarily not 
working  
4= Retired, unable to work  
5= Farmer  
6= Fisherman  
7= Professional (lawyer, etc.)  
8= Owner of a shop, craftsmen, etc. 
9=Business proprietors, etc.  
10= Employed professional 
(employed doctor, etc.)  
11= General management, etc.  
12= Middle management, etc.  
13= Employed position, at desk  
14= Employed position, travelling 
15= Employed position, service job 
16=Supervisor  
17= Skilled manual worker  
18= Unskilled manual worker, etc. 
d15a 
 
